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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
I.AKI<~ l'Hl~J,~I\: IHRIUA'l'lON CO .. 
a <·orporation, 
Appellant 
vs. 
DON CLYDE and KATJ<J CLYDE, 
his wife; LARRY :F'. CLYDE and 
BARBARA CLYDE, his wife; 
LO FIS A. KIRK and JANE KIRK, 
hit; wife; JAMES F. CLYDE and 
~:ARLEN:BJ CLYDE, his wife; 
ROBERT CLYDE and LYNETTE 
CLYD:BJ, his wife, 
Respondents 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
11148 
11his is an action to quiet the title to certain lands 
and waters, and to accompUsh the incidental voiding of 
n deed and contract ex{'cuted by the president acting 
without the knowledge of the board of directors of a 
nintnal irrigation company. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was heard by the Wasatch County court 
without a jury on amended pleadings. The court entered 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that admitted 
no resolution preceded the president of appellant signing 
the contract and deed, but holding that the board mem-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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bers ratified the action of the president. Hence, the 
contract and the deed were upheld as validly executed hy 
the corporation. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks reversal of the Findings, Con-
clusions and the Judgment and, in lieu thereof, a 
judgment that the deed ard contract disposing of tht-
irrigation company'r;: fishing rights, requiring the irri-
gation company to cause water to flow down the Mills 
Ditch for the benefit of respondent and defining the 
terms and conditions of a right-of-way acquisition are 
void or at least voidable and that the irrigation company 
has caused them to be voided. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Lake Creek Irrigation Company, plaintiff-appellant. 
a non-profit, mutual irrigation corporation organizt-d 
under Utah laws in 1888 (Exhibit 1) and reorganized in 
1943 (Exh. 2) with its principal place of business in 
Wasatch County, owns by decree the flow of Lake Creek 
east of Heber, Utah and stores its water in Witt Lake 
and Deer Valley Reservoir for the sole benefit of the 
shareholders. (Exh. 5), (Tr. 11) "The board of directors 
shall have the power to make by-laws for the manage-
ment of said company, the regulation of its offic0rs, the 
control of its property for the benefit of its stockholder~ . 
. . . " (Exh. 2) There are five directors. There are no 
known by-laws. 
As early as 1946 reasons for postponing the opening 
day of fishing from early June to July 1 were discussed 
and accomplished as requested by respondents. (Tr. 178) 
2 
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Ti1t· i11i1111k::; of an annual nweting in 1952 show early 
attempts at cooperation with the respondEmts. (J£xh. 6, 
p. CJ(j) Board members remember talk of cooperating 
11·ith Mr. Clyde in the opening date for fishing. (Tr. 70, 
.::2, 101) 
[n July 1956 appellant had discussions and a verbal 
agreement with respondent Bob Clyde concerning a right-
of-way to be given appellant if the latter would fence 
"one side of the ditch, and a water trough put in and 
a bridge across the cement ditch." (Exh. 6, p. 74) Pur-
suant to said understanding, appellant constructed the 
eement ditch down the canyon during 1956, 1957. (Tr. 
11 l. p. 77, 78, 79, 80, 82) 
Problems came up concerning erosion, and the fenc-
ing of the cement ditch, between the appellant and re-
spondents. Respondents claimed the loss of lambs when 
they were trailing the herd "up the county road and 
when we came to that bridge where the sheep goes across, 
a few at a time, they backed up and some of them got out 
on the Bond land. There was no fence there, there was 
an old broken down fence that would not hold sheep and 
it would not have been possible to hold them there." 
(Tr. 198) "We were moving this herd of sheep up there 
and they had finished this cement ditch. There was no 
warning, no sign. We had no information at all regarding 
it. . . . We found 43 lambs where the cement ditch ran 
out dead, drowned .... " (Tr 187) 
Near March 31, 1959 attorney Glen Hatch requested 
the president and secretary to come to his office regard-
ing an agreement to be signed. Mr. Hatch had repre-
3 
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sented appellant irrigation eornpany t>arliPr (Tr. I !1, ;)::!) 
but now represented the respondent Clydes. 
On March 31, 1959 the pn"sidPnt and :-;(•<·rdar~·, tl11· 
latter not being a nwmlwr of tlw hoard, (Tr. S2) sigmd 
Exhibit 7, the agreement in controwrs~· hPrP. Tlw prPsi 
dent testified he did not read thP do<'m11ent thoroughly, 
(Tr. 25) never got a copy thewof, ('l'r. 4(i, 8~) an<l that 
only parts of thP agreement, Exhibit 7, PVPr came t11 
the attention of the board of directors (Tr. 45, 46) nor 
was a resolution ever givPn authorizing him to sign. 
The attorney for Respondents wrote a letter dated April 
6, 1959 to the president of the watPr cornpan~· (Exh. ~) 
requesting him to obtain a rPsolntion of tlw hoard of 
directors authorizing tl1P PXPcntion of the documents. This 
was nevPr done. At no tinw did the board know ih· 
president had signed the dePd, Exhibit 8, or thP contract 
Exhibit 7 (Tr. 88, 48, 49) and six years aftPr signing it. 
he denied to a stockholdPr he had PXPcutPd such a docu-
ment. (Exh. 6, p. 107) 
The president candidly testified hP did this coll· 
tracting and signing "with no authority whatever." (Tr. 
48) He said he felt it desirable to disclose to the board 
of "directors most of the provisions of thP contract 
except fishing rights .... " (Tr. 48) "When the~· found 
it out they were disturbed." He tPstified he did not know 
just how far the agreement went, himsPlf. In this coll· 
nection, the commitment to pass waters down the Mills 
Ditch are most interesting! He positively testified that 
as to the directors knowing of the action: "None of 
them, to my knowledge, knew about it." (Tr. 49) He 
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11a;-; a;;kt·d "Did you ever di::-;eu;;;; it with any mewuers of 
)Our hoard, tlw fi;;hing rights or tlw eontraet for the 
fo;Jiing right::\'? and answered, ".No, the only thing dis-
nissed on the fish with the directors was the 01Jening 
day." (Tr. 59) 
Tlw sPcretary of appdlant at no time read the agree-
111Pnt 1H' sig1wd, Exhibit 7 (Tr. ~()) nor did hP evt>r get 
u copy of it or the det>d. ( 'l'r. 85, 87) He thought it con-
l'erned fixing the spillway, hnilding a h'ncP, but he had 
110 knowledge the agrPPlllrnt coneernPd "fishing rights." 
(Tr. 87) While hP might Jia,·e discussed s01w· elements 
of the agreement with lllPmlwrn of the board, ht> positively 
lt'stified an cross examination !H; did not talk about 
"the matter of fishing rights" because "the fishing rights 
11·pre never brought up at that time.'' (Tr. 94, 45 ). How-
l'VPr, after March 31, 1959, some work was done on 
fencing. 
Many board members and stockholders fished in 
\Vitt Lake before and after said agreement and deed 
1rPre executed. (Tr. 125, 88, 100, 112) Oblivious to the 
dPed, Russell Wall planted 2,000 legal size fish and the 
appellant paid for them. ('.l'r. 127) 'l'he Witt area was 
posted with a KEEP OUT, PRIVATE FISH PONDS 
~ign dnring 1964. (Tr. 126, Exh. 9) 
At no time from the date Exhibit 7 was executed 
1mtil after the suit herein was instituted was an easement 
llmdered appellant as called for in said alleged agree-
nwnt. (Tr. 200, 203, 204) 
At no time did appellant ever turn water into the 
Mills Ditch for respondent. (Tr. 187) However, respond-
5 
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ents physically took water i11to the Mill~ Ditcl1 ocC'a:-;ion 
ally. (Tr. 201) Respondent~ were newr (kcn~ed auy 
water into the Mills Ditch, (l!Jxh. 5) and no right other 
than as in Exhibit 7 was ever claimed. 
In January of 1965, stockholder \Vall discowred eYi-
dence of the contraet and deed, whereupon tlte :-;uhject 
was discussed at the annual meeting. ''Authorization was 
given to the boftrd to preserve the fishing rights of the 
company." (l~xh. 6, p. 106) That same day, the board 
of directors heard a report from \Vall that pursuant to 
an assignment from the board in July of 1964 he had 
undertaken to procure a private pond fishing permit 
from the Utah Fish and Game department only to learn 
that one of the defendant-respondents had reported to 
that department the appellant company had given a deed 
to the respondents for all fishing. vVall further reported 
that when apprised of said deed, he had approached 
appellant's president Richie who said "there was no such 
deed to his knowledge." Wall went to the court house 
and "found a Quit Claim Del'd to Don Clyck for thi> 
title to this property." Thereupon a photo copy of the 
deed was presented to the board "and the Board imii-
cated that the legality of the deed should be checked since 
there had been no resolution given for this transaction 
in the minutes of the company." (Exh. 6, p. 107-108) 
A week later the board again met and discussed the 
lack of authorization for the deed and authorized the 
employment of counsel to "bring legal action against 
Don Clyde and to restore these rights to the company." 
(Exh. 6, p. 109) At a board meeting on July 10, 1965 
the president stated that the agreement (Exh. 7) had 
6 
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Geen signed "but that it didn't convey his intent in var-
ious paragraphs." Further, the min ntes n·cord: .. . . . 
the hoard agrePd that it was not in the pmn·r of the 
l'n·sid<·nt to p~·nnit the Clydes to drn,1· wat<·r fr0111 ti1e 
lJc·Pr \'all<·y HesPnoir and dinrt it to thu ~dills H<'S('l'-
rnir. . . . Tlw antliority to do this \1·n::; qw·sti011Pd h)' 
,:1,. i;o<tl'd 1na:-,mi1c-li as all \\'<tf:·r in t]1;s area is CO\'t•red 
by <l<·<·ree and is ston•d in the company n·servoirs or 
privak n•s<•rvoirs who have storage rights or used for 
inigation purposes nndn decn·<'. Parag1·aph () pntain-
illg to fishing rights. Pn·sid<>nt Ritehie again stated 
that he was not aware that he was conn•ying the fishing 
rights to Don Clyde. He ex1)lained there had be<·n a 
prohl<'rn of regulating the opening of the fishing season 
\\·ith regard to the livestock operations of Don Clyde 
in the area. He thought all he was conveying was the 
right to regulate the time of opening of fishing in the 
area. Directors George Holmes and Kenneth Anderson 
who had been directors during the period of negotiations 
in rnsu said they had never had any knowledge that fish-
ing rights had been deeded to Clyde. They also stated 
that th<·y had not ruad tliis agreP11wnt nor sePn it before." 
Mr. \Vall was instrnctd again to enter litigation concern-
ing the matter (Exh. 6, p. 110) 
A special meeting of the shareholders of appellant 
was held October 17, 1966 at which time 413 out of 571 
shares of prililary stock were prC's<'nt and voting. A lilo-
tion was made that "The board of directors be authorized 
to take any action necessary, including court action to 
set aside that certain Quit-Claim Deed dated March 31, 
7 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1959 and that certain agn·(·1111·11t datl'd ~lard1 :~1, l!lfJ~I 
giving to the ClydP's tlw fit:il1ing riglttt:i in Witts Lah 
and Deer Valley and other items .... The result of thf• 
voting was 344 sharPs in favor ot' titP motion. (i!I shar1>, 
opposed thP motion." (ExJ1. G, p. 1:21) 
Being thus instnH.:tPd by the din•ctors a~ m·ll as 
the stock110lck·rs, this c:iction \\"as dnly fil1•d. 
\Vith tlw PXCL~ption of the contract (.B~xJ1 7) and tlH· 
deed (1£xJ1. 8) appellant corporation had lw"'n at all tirnt>~. 
managed and still is, by the Board of Directors acting as 
a board. ( 'I'r. 97, 78, 88, 108, 4:7, -±8, 80) 
POINT I 
NO MUTUAL IRRIGATION COMPANY CAN TRANS-
FER PROPERTY WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF 
TWO-THIRDS OF THE STOCKHOLDERS. 
Although the lower court refnsed to find that tl11 
plaintiff is a mutual irrigation company as rP(itWstPd b:i 
plaintiff, the record is conclusiw on this mattn. (1£xl1. 
1, 2, J R 30) 
Assuming, which is not tlw case, that the hoard 
of directors of this mutual irrigation company, at a 
formal director's meeting had passPd a n·solution author-
izing the president and secn'tary to »XPcute a contraC't 
and dPt'd of thP corporation <·onn·:»ing rl'al and iwrsonal 
property owned by the mutual irrigation company, such 
action would be a nuJlity under Utah law. 'rhis court ha~ 
held that articles of incorporation includP h)· implication 
within them all applicable statutes of the state existent 
a the time of the incorporation. 
In the case of Fowler et al v. Provo Bench Canal 
8 
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!1111111:1uu 1 ,,., '.J!J !'tali :.!1i-;-. 1111 I':.!, :r13 !ht> (·011rt said: 
"It 1s 11 f'll ::,;(•ttl('<l tltat t]J(' .\rticl('s of lncor-
i "•ratio11 of a <'<>rporatiOn lorn1 ti!(' basis of a con-
i rad a111011g· otli1·rs, lil't11·(•(·n thP corporation and 
its :.;to<·kl1oldurs. It is also \\'Pl! :st>ttled that 'the 
prn1·isions 1·011tai1wd i11 th(' Constitution and 
.;tatnt(•s an· as n1ucli a part of tht· articl1's of 
in<·orpornJion as tl1ough tlH·y 1\·pn• Pxpressly 
"opiPd tl\('J'Pin.' \r('('<lP \'. J·~1m11a CoppPr Co. 58 
l"tah :J:2...J:, :2(J() f>. ;"'>17, :-JUJ; Nalt LakP Automobile 
( 'o. v. KPith O'lhi<'11 ( 'o., -1-;) Utah 21S, 143 P. 1015; 
<lan·y 1·. ~t. .Jrn· ,\lining Co., 32 etah -1-97, ~n P. 
::r;!J, 1:2 L.H. A., X. ~ .. 554" 
:\t th<' ti111<> of tlw i1]('orporation of LakP Cr('t>k Irri-
"ation Company thPrP \\'as in PxistPnce ~ection 16-6-9 
I TA which says: 
"'l'IH· board of dirPctors, trnstePs, vestrymen, 
\\·ardPns or otl1<·r officPrs provid<'d for in the 
artich·s of incorporation shall have the care, cus-
tody and control of thP corporate pro1wrty and 
,:Jiall PXl'rcisP th<' corpo;·ate pmvPrs, subject to 
thP provisions of thP nrticl1•s of incorporation and 
b.daws, and may, nnless otherwise provided in 
thP artiel<'s of incorporation or bylaws, upon con-
·w11t of f7rn-thirds of thl' 111rmbrrs of the corpora-
tion }ll'<'s1·nt at a 11H·ding dnly called and held, 
1110rtgagP, encmnlwr, lease ,sell or conn•y any real 
or personal propert:- or the corporation, unless 
sneh prop<'rty has beE·n n'ceived as a gift or 
1h·visP for some spPeial pnrposP ,and, if so re-
c<>ind, it shall b<' nsPd and applied only for such 
pnrposP. Unless otherwise providl'd in the articles 
of incorporation or b~·laws, a meeting for such 
pnrposP 1-lhall lw eall<'d, npon not less than four-
tPen davs' notice to be given by publication in 
:-;onw nP;\'spa1wr having general circulation in the 
place wlwrP Emch corporation has its principal 
9 
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place of business, or if there is no such iw\vspapl,r. 
then by posting on tlH' door of the usual mP1·ting 
place or places; such notice shall statl' the time, 
place and object of the vroposed lll<'l·ting." (Em 
phasis added) 
Under the terms of this highly formal statute it 
requires a two-thirds Yote of the stockholders to autl101-
ize a transfer of the property. Interpretation of similar 
statutes has been befr.re other courts. In the casP of 
Lacy v. Gwrn, (Calif.) 78 Pac. 30, the con rt held that it 
was unlawful for the directors of a mining corporatioll 
to dispose of its mining ground unless such acts were 
ratified by the holders of two-thirds of the capital stock 
In the case of Fowler v. Great Soitthern Telcz)lw111 
and Telegraph Cornpany, (Louisiana) 29 So. 271, lH'arl 
note 2 of the case states: 
"The measure of power invested in the board 
of directors of defendant's company is determined 
by its charter and bylaws and the board's action 
in excess thereof is not binding upon the corpora-
tion." 
In the case of Forbes vs. San Rafael Titrnpikc Co. 
50 Calif, 340, ________ p ________ , the statute provided that nn 
conveyance of property conld be made without a two-
thirds vote of stockholders. In that case a note and mort-
gage were executed by a majority vote and the court held 
that the note was valid, 
"but the mortgage stands upon a differmt foot-
ing. It could not originally haYe been ext>cnted, so 
as to bind the corporation except by a votP of bro-
thirds in interest of the stockholders and it conl<l 
not be ratified by less number." 
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA CORPORA'rIONS. 
10 
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11· •·1r1a11(•nt Pdition, \'oL (iA, 19;)0 n•v. n>L paµ;\' ()(j() states: 
"In c:ornP stat«c; it i~: lH 1:1 that \\<'<'l'i' tlw 
<'liurtn of n <'orporation or a statntP prohibits a 
rnnY!'_\'HJ~(·(• or phlg'<· of its pl'OJlPd v w:~11ont the 
<'onsent of tli(' sku·p 1io1clt•rs or of~ c<•rtain pro-
portion of tli1·111, snch consPnt is ess<'ntial to the 
\·~1lidit:· of a e01wp:·::uwe or p1PdgP. Snch provi-
,;1011s do not <>Xt('ncl to m»re options to sell. On 
the otlH·r hand, it has bePn hPld that under a 
:-;tfttntP ]JPrmittin.~ a eorponi.tion to sell and con-
\'('>' all of its prop<"rt~\ with thP consPnt of a 
spPeified JH'l'C'Pntap;P of sharPholders, that share-
hold<'rs ma~· anthoriz<> the granting of an option 
for thP sale of all t11P pl'O}H'rt:· of a corporation ... 
"In otll<T stat"~' it is k·ld that the prohibition 
is inknded merdy for the benefit of the share-
holders, that it does not rendPr a eonYPYance with-
ont tlwir consPnt void, bnt merely makes it void-
able, and thc:.t another cannot attack a conveyance 
or pledge for \Yant of their consent. 
"In some states, by statute, mining corpora-
tions cannot dispose of any of thPir mining ground 
without a two-thirds vote of the stockholders. A 
statute providing that mining corporations shall 
have no power to sell tl1P mining gronnds, in whole 
or in part, without the transfer being approved 
by two-thirds of the shareholders does not author-
ize two-thirds of the sharPhold('rS of a prosperous 
corporation to sell all of its property against 
the protest of any other shareholders" 
In the case of Boston Compm1y vs. Clawson, 66 Utah 
103, 240 P 1G5, the qn<>stion arose as to the sale of all 
of the property of the corporation, and the court in com-
paring the California statute with the Utah statute said, 
"TherP is a marked distinction between the 
California statute and the Utah statute (Section 
869) relied on by defendant. The California stat-
11 
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uk rnakPs the dispositio11 of tl1(· prup(•rty 1mhrn 
fnl unless ratifiPd by tht> st<)('khol<lPrs. Th» lltali 
statntP sa:·s it shall not hP hin<ling on tl1P eorpon1 
tion .... " 
This interpretation makt•s the att<'lllJ>t<'d <·om·<'Yami· 
m California absolutely ,·oid and till· attP111ph•<l <·onw1. 
ance in Utah voidable. 
In tlw instant cast> tlw stockholdt>rs lian n•j1·<'t1·il 
the attemptPd conveyance (J~xh. (i, p. 121) and hrougl11 
this action to quiet tlwir title to all of the corporatio11 
assets. 
In thP easP of 8liernu111 1. llorl1i11. Imm J()(I ,\'.\\". (j:_!IJ. 
the court stated, 
"Upon the board of dirPctors was eonfrrn·d 
the power to make bylaws for the rPgulation of 
the association and the manag<•ment of its affair.-
and business, if consistent with the articlPs of 
incorporation. WhilP tlw bnsinPss of tlH· assoeia 
tion was nnd<>r the management of thP board ol' 
directors, and the presidPnt ;.;uhjPd to its control. 
both '\Yere governed by tlw articl<>s of incorpora-
tion and statutes of the state dPfining and lirnitinµ 
their respPctive dntit•s and pmn~rs. Any act of tl11· 
president contrary to this, P\·en though dirPcte<l 
or acquiesced in by tile board of dirPdors con· 
stituted a breach of duty, for the hoard itself 
was without authorit:· to o\·prridt> or ignorP tli1· 
laws of the state or the articlPs of inrorporatiou 
bv the members of the association." 
In tl1e case of Layl101tr11e vs. Wrape, (Colo.) 211 P. 
:~G7, a corporation had patents relating to oil processing 
The bylaws of the corporation stated that there ronld 111' 
no sale, lease, or disposition of property without t]H· 
consent in writing of 75% of the stockholdPrs. 'T'lH' boarrl 
12 
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l 
of din·etors rnadP a (·ontra('I ('(1t1\-1·: ing" ('1·rini 11 rigJti, 
connp(•.t('(l "·ith thP lffO('(•ssing aJ1,l ('(·J'tain s1ol'kl1oldn~. 
brought ::;nit against the dirPcton; and tlw thil'd partie::; 
to annul thP contract. Tlw l'Olll't lwld for tltP storkltoldPr:,, 
that thP eontract was void and ::;tated: 
"A::-; to the ::;peond point, we think till· ('Ottrt wa:-
riglit in holding that the eontract was in violatio11 
of the bylaw. It is dPfinitPlY within th<' tern1cc 
h<·eause it transfer::-; a definit('. interPst in tit,, ]Jl'O-
cess, conpled \Yith anthorit:- to act. This is not 
a lllPre agene:·, but an irrevoeable powPr if valid. 
'l'o bP valid then•fore, the rontract rPquired a 
mePting of the stockholdPrs, and is invalid with-
out it. ... " 
In tlw rasP of A11aco11da Co]Jper J/i11. Co. rs. Jfrinz, 
(Mont.) ()!) Pac. 909, the qne::;tion arosP as to tliP author-
it."- of a board of directors of a mining eornpan:· to dt•al 
with the property of a corporation and the court said. 
"Fnder the provisions of law in force at tlw 
tinw these negotiations took place, thP board of 
dirPctors of a mining eorporation organized under 
the laws of this statP had no authority to sell. 
leasP, mortgage, or othc•rwisP disposP of its real 
estate, nor could the hoard eonfer such anthority 
upon an agent, whether he was an officer or other 
person. Sections 492 and 493 of tlw fifth dfrision 
of the compiled statutes of 1887 brought forward 
into Civ. Code No. 1012, 1013 are applieahlt>, and 
require any such disposition of property to bP 
authorized by consent of stockholders owning at 
least two-thirds of the shares of the capital stock 
at a meeting called and condneh•d as therein di-
rected. Unless these provisions of law are oh-
served, a sale, lease, mortgage or other disposi-
tion of the property could not be made .... 
" ... But until the necessary authority is ob-
13 
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tairn·d by thv board of <lin•ctors iwithPr tlwy nor 
the presichmt can execute a conveyanc<'., n~r can 
a sp<~cific performance by the corporation itt->elf 
be enforced." 
Wlwn the contract and clP<'d calkd for cfo,position 
ul the prnp('rty rights of the appellant, the failure of 
the partiPs to aehievP :1 h\·o-thirds \·ot<' of approval of 
the stockholclurs of appt>Jlant made the attemvted docu-
llH'nh; a rnJlity, and tlw stockholclr>r::; have directed tlw 
bringing of tli[s suit to protect their inkrests. (1£xh. Ii, 
ll· 121) 
POINT II 
EVEN IN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS, THE BOARD 
OF DIRECTORS MUST FORMALLY APPROVE A 
CONVEYANCE OF PROPERTY. 
The next two points are discussed as if plaintiff. 
appellant were a business corporation which it is not. 
In the case of Lockwitz v. Pine Tree Mining Corn-
1iany, 37 Utah 349, 108 Pac. 112R, the corporation leasPd 
its mine with an option to buy, specifying the date by 
which the option must be exercised; thereafter, the presi-
dent of the corporation extended the time for exercising 
the option without authority from the board. Held that 
the extension of time was a nullity and the court stated: 
"The power of corporate officers or dirN'tors 
to act as the agent of the corporation may lw af· 
fected in three ways: l, by the statutes of the 
state in which the corporation is created; 2, bY 
the articles of incorporation; and 3, hy the bylaw' 
of the corporation. If not so regulated, the exer· 
cisci of the corporate powers are controlled by 
the common law . . . 
"The hoard of directors to whom the author· 
itv to hind the corporation is committed is not the 
14 
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individ1ial dirPctors scatt\'red lien· and there. 
whose assent to a giv<'n act rna.\· he coll1·d:·d hY 
a diligent canvas::.;Pr, hut it i::.; the board sittin<• and . . b 
con::.;ultmg together in a bodv. Individual direc-
tors, or any nnmber of them ·less than a quornm. 
have no authority as directors to bind the corpo-
ration. And this is equall~- the rule, althongh tl1P 
director who assumes to do so mav own a maior-
ity of shares . . . · v 
"The powers of the corporation under our 
statute must be exrrcised by the board of direct-
ors u:hcn a.,·sembled as a body. Tlw p.resident 
could not make a binding contract nor modify an 
existing one unless authorized to do so by snch a 
quorum .... The president's individual act was of 
no binding force or effect upon respondent. 
"When the adoption of any partciular forrn 
or mode is necessary, to confer the authority in 
the first instance, there can be no valid ratifica-
tion except in the same manner. Thus, if a cor-
poration can only authorize a particular act or 
contract by a power under seal, or by formal 
vote, ratification of such an act or contract must 
be under seal or by a formal vote, as the case 
may be." (Emphasis added) 
In the case of Copper King vs. Hanson, 52 Utah 605. 
176 P. 623, tlw court stated: 
"The president of a eorporation ordinarily 
has only the power of a director or such additional 
powers as may be directly conferred upon him by 
the board of directors. (citing cases) While it is 
true that the president or general manager of a 
cor1)oration sometimes exercises quite extensiYe 
powers in the management of its business, he is 
nevertheless acting all the time under the express 
or implied authority of the directors, who are the 
real managers of the corporation." 
15 
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111 ti1• 1·<1:-:1· ()I ;-:.11111tu1t H<:tigP and /,irr·sluck Co. 18. 
fl<'('·. l t 1. :.!nd l~)."i. :.!C: i>~ :1st. tltis <'Otll'l li<'ld tliat 
t Ii!' <·orporat<· pow1·rs as 011tlin1·d in thP <'hart Pr al'P ~nli. 
J•'<'t to strirt int('l'prdation. 
Th<· l;tali <'OHrt lias lH•ld tliat wht•nPvPr a <'orporation 
n~sigus its JHl\n•r:-: it 111u:-t do :-:o tlirnugh its board of 
dirPdors. ~('(': Uou /'S. r•)//11!/ Jfr11"s Con::;o/idated Co. 
"/!<'nlfir.· .l/1 /'('(!llfi/, / 11..,/,f11tio:1, ;)7 F. :2~0, 107 P. ~:)i, 
ind .L11d<'r~o11 1·.,. Ura1ifs1·illc .\Torth l:Villmr lrri,r111tio11 
r 'o .. :'il L 1:17, ](i!-l P. lliS, arnl Ch111J1111u1 /'.;. T1n11 J,1111111/111 
( 'o .. ~I {T. I :'i, .J.7 I'. :2d 1054. 
POINT III 
EVEN IF PLAINTIFF WERE A BUSINESS COR-
PORATION, RATIFICATION MUST BE WITH FULL 
KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS. 
1 :) Arn . .Jnr. 930 statPs: 
''It is a general principle of agPnr~- tliat 
knowledgP on the part of thP prinei pal of thr 
matPrial facts of a trarnmction done on his ht>half 
h.Y an agPnt withont autho1·ity is an PssPntial p)r. 
n1Pnt to a ratification of such transaction, and 
this is tnw as to thP ratification hy a corporation 
of the nnanthori~wd aets of its officprs and agents. 
Applying this rnlP, acqui('SCPncP, or thP receipt or 
rPtention of thP JffOCPeds of an unauthorized 
transaction do not amount to ratification if not 
acc01npani1•d h~- knowledge of the material facts 
concerning tlw transaction. As a similar applira· 
tion, ratification by a corporation of a contract 
made by the president without authority must be 
made with full knowledge of the h·rms of the con-
tract." 
There is not one scrap of evidence that any of the 
directors, othPr than the president, knew that the prrsi- , 
dent was com·eying the fishing rights, or wat<:r rights. 
16 
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Dir<•dor Hohw·:- 11·:-tifi1·d tlntt at no ti11t1· did ]1P 
kno\\· tliat tl1P fisl1i11g right:- or \YatPr i·igltt:- \\'Pn· PVP11 
atternptPd to lw eomrp~·('d. (Tr. 9-.;, ~)!) and :207) 
Dir<>dor Crook IWVPl' l1Pard an.' dis<·11ssion of <·m1-
Vt')·an<'P of fisliin~ rigl1ts to tli<" l'lyd<•:,; (Tr. 70) and 
tPstifi<·d that affrr disput<· camp up ahout tlH· lamh:,; lW 
furtltn work "·as <lorn· on th<· frn<'<'. ('l'r. 7 4 and 75) 
1'hert> is no FvidencP he PV<·r heard uwntion of a con-
v<>yan<'<' of wa frr right:,;. 
'111iPrP is no p\·idPnCP tliat vic<·-]Jl'Psident Andt·rs011 
ever heard of a conveyance of fishing or watPr riglihi 
until lH• saw tliP contraet in 1 !lli:J. 
DirPctor Bond nPVPl' ''"nt to a <'iaim('d 11H·ding 
at G!Pn Hatch's office and never }H•ard of a sa!P ol' 
fishing rights. (Tr. 211) 
ThP agrPPmPnt (Ij~xh. 7) to kP<·p \\·at<'r in tlH• ~fills 
Ditel1 amounts to a conveyance of the watPr rights. 
In Grand ralley Irrigatio11 Co. I'. Fruita lrnpro11. 
llll'nf Co. (Colo.) 8G Pac. 324 th<· co11rt stated, 
"It is claimPd that thP stoekl1oldPrs hy tlwir 
aeqniPsePncP havP waived or ratified this eon-
traet. 1'his <'onld not hP dom· hut in tlH .. mannn 
provided in thf-' h)·-law PXePpt as to any indi,·idnal 
stockholdPr who acquiesced 1Cith f11ll k1wu-ledg1. 
ThPrf-' is no such sho\\'ing nor anything approacli-
ing it as to majority of the plaintiffs hPlow.'' 
(Emphasis add Pd) 
Again thPrP is no <>vidt·nee that an.' stoekholdPr. 
other than thf-' president, had any knowledge of thP agrPe-
nwnt reached hetween the president and Clydes. While 
some dirPctors had information about compromising the 
' loss of lambs, erosion and fencing, there is not the slight-
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est evidence that auy dirvctor PXC<•pt tlw vresidPnt kl!('\\ 
or had reason to kno\\' tlH' ::il~hjc•ct of \\'Ul\'r uioving: lllto 
the Mills Ditch was involved, nol' a d<'t'ding of all fo] 1_ 
ing rights. 
ln tlt(· easP f;lfJ!/' ('11 c. Wuolcy, (i4 LT. 18:3, L~8 P 
90G th<· coitrt in disui:~sing ratifcation statPd: 
'"Tl1Pn' \n1~' no ratifieation in this eas<·, how 
<'\·er, and 1w11r iUI-" !,·9ull.1; JJOssil1le for tlw reason 
that t1 1 '' ~;tockJ1old<'l'S other than appellants !tad 
no knowlt>dg\' of the agre<·11wnt lwtwl'' ll tli;•m anrl 
tlw dPft>ndant by the t<>nns of ,,-li~cli tli.· U]JJll'I 
!ants werP to n·c<•ivl' the fnll amount t_!1('\' !tad 
paid to thP compan~· for their stocks and l~ondi 
If that fact had been k1101vn to the stockhoJrl,·r~ 
the result might easily lwve bc~en diffen•nt. 1t i1 
Plementary however that no ratificutio11 tak s 
place wdcss all the facts rtrr' lwow11 to those zr/111 
have the power to ratify.·· (Emphasis addPd) 
In the case of Aggeller a1!d Jlusscr Seed Co. l 
Blood, 73 Utah 120, 272 Pac. 933, the Utah court held thai 
in the ahsenc<' of initial anthority given in advance tn 
the president to execnte a lease, the lease wonld lw imalid 
unless the business corporation ratified the presidPnt'f 
acts or the president had apparent authority to exccntt 
the same and stated, 
"Ratification may be informal. It need not 
be by formal vote. The assent of a corporation 
to acts done on its account may be inferrrd 1n 
the same manner that the ass~nt of a natural 
person may be. . 
"Acquiescence by silence may amount to r~!i 
fication as well as affirmative action. Acqmes 
cence may rest on the principle of ratification or 
upon the principle of estoppel. 
18 
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''It will be renwrnbered, however, that acqiti-
cscencc without knowledge of material facts is not 
ratification.'' (Emphasis added) 
·with tlw exce1Jtion of Pres:dent Ritchie, 110 director 
knew of any new agreement with the Clydes. rrhey all 
thought insofar as th0 fencing was concerned tlw:, wer<' 
performing the agreement sPt out in the minutes (Exh. 
11, p. 74) of July, 1956, and ratification is impossible 
because of lack of knowledge of the directors. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF FOR GOOD CAUSE CANCELLED ANY 
PURPORTED CONTRACT. 
Assuming that the contract between the irrigation 
company and the Clydes was validly executed, (·which 
we deny) the corporation on June 24, 1965 rescinded it 
by directing law-yers to bring action setting it and the 
deed aside. (Exh. 6, p. 108) 
The contract and deed were executed on or about 
March 31, 1959. More than six years had elapsed and 
the Clydes had not performed the contract on their part. 
They were supposed to execute a deed coyering the 
right of way which they bad failed to do. Mr. Clyde's 
nttorney was asked for the deed (Tr. 144 and 209) in 
1965. No deed was forthcoming (Tr. 200) and the statute 
of limitations had run on the contract. This was reason-
able grounds for cancelling the contract and asking for 
return of consideration. 
9 Am J ur 373 states, 
"It may be laid down as a general rule that 
tbe abandonment or mere failure to perform a 
contract honestly made, or some or more of its 
provisions, does not justify the equitable relief 
of recission or cancellation, except where the facts 
would defeat an action at law." 
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Th(~ deed ha:-: 11\'\\'l' h\'('Jl dPliwn·d to plaintiff. (Tr. 
:~00, :.204) After tl1is action \\as co111nH'rtePd a dPPd irn~ 
lih~d with the clerk of tlw eomt (K\lt. 1-1-) t'or d<•l11ur.1 t 11 
plaintiff, if and \dH'n a l'inal <·011('lt1:-:io11 in l'avor 01· di•-
ft>ndanhl wa::; PntPn-'d. ?\' o h-'rnlPr of an;· t y p1 · to c·o11·r 
plaintiff's costs \Hls mad~~. 
POINTY 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION ~O AMEND FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
rrhe lower COlll't erred in not finding that tlt1• pJai11 
tiff is a non-profit eorporation and a rnutual inigation 
eompany. (.Jndg. Hole 30) l~xhihits 1 and :.2 an· eonclu-
sivP on this and there is no contradicting t(':--:tirnon:. 
E'inding of Fact and Conelnsion of Law l\o. ~ ar1· 
in t>ITor. There is no v\·idence that def Pndant::; own am 
i·ights in the land or \rnter. Def Pndants own evidmce 
:-;hows the chain of title to the snrronnding land t>tc. to 
lw in J. W. Clyde, a stranger to the la\v snit, (gxlt. 13) 
err. 192) and even that deed does not conw:· graiing 
rights or watPring rights on plaintiff':-; land and r<>sPr-
voir. 
Defendants did not <'Wn rlairn that the prt>sident 
nnd the st>cn~tary of plaintiff had been granted authority 
to execute Exhibits 7 and 8, but the lo-v\·er court in its 
conclusions of law stated, 
"That the officers of the corporation who 
executed the agreement and quit claim deed had 
apparent ostensible authority to execute the sa:ne 
for the eorporation and the plaintiff corporation 
is estopped to deny such authority." 
This conclusion is contrary to all of the PvidencP 
20 
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All of the evidence was that t11<· 111anage11wnt or tlH· 
corporation was always conducted by the board of direc-
tors. (Tr. 48, 78, 80, 88, 97 and 108) Even the defendanb 
recognized that the officers had no apparent or ostensibk 
authority as is shown by Exhibit 12 written by their 
attorney. Defendants attempted to show apvarent au-
thorit~· in the president, ('f'r. 47) but got a contrary 
answer. ('J1r. 48) They could not have been misled and 
thrre cannot be any estoppel. 
Finding of Fact No. 11 is also in error. [ t states 
that "There is no evidence that the business of said cor-
poration was ever transacted by other than the president 
and secretary thereof." The manner in which the appel-
lant corporation conducted its business is shown on th(· 
following pages of the minute book, F~xhibit 6, pages 72, 
7:~. 74, 77, 78 ,79, 83, 84, 85, 86, 89, 90, 92, etc., and con-
clusively show that the board of directors ran and eon-
trolled the corporation. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS 
AN ATTORNEY FEE. 
The court erred in granting defendants an attorney 
fr<> in this matter. This fee was granted because plain-
tiff amended its complaint at the end of its case to con-
form to the evidence. Rule 15 (b) of the rules of civil 
procedure permit such amendment. The original com-
plaint and the amended complaint were both quiet titlf\ 
actions and the amendment was permissible. We can 
find nothing that permits the court to assess attorney's 
fees in such a case. Even the claimed contract does not 
provide for attorney's fees. 
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This entire case from the filing of the complaint 
to thit:> appeal has hL'en whdher the defendant:::; lia\'i 
ac:c1nired from the plaintiff any rights to water or am 
rights to fit:>h. The form of procedure hat> h<•en slight!) 
changed, lmt the subt>tance it> identieal. 
CONCLUSION 
It might be argrn~d that fit>liing rights are a minor 
part of the ut:>es of \Viti Lah, the primary imryio,1 
thereof being for irrigation. For fishing rights to iJ, 
worth anything, Witt Lake cannot be drained each yrw. 
bnt provision made for a water carry-over in ordPr to 
sustain fish culture. If rights to fish-culture exist in 
respondents, then it has taken water from the irrigator' 
to sustain the collateral functions of fishing, and tlw 
·water users have been damaged. 
For respondents to succeed in taking water from 
vVitt Lake into and through the Mills Ditch is the appro 
pri.ation of property certainly not within the provinct 
of the president or secretary alone, nor by the board 
of directors deliberately acting. Under section lG-G-~ 
use it takes a two-thirds vote of the water users, stock-
holders. 
Even in business corporations the president and 
secretary may not convey without the formal approval 
of the board of directors and they cannot ratify ·wit]wnt 
full knowledge. 
Even if the contract had been valid the corporatio11 
legitimately cancelled the same for non-performance hY 
respondents. The statute of limitations had run ani! 
appellant could not have been successful in an aclioo 
1 
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for specific performance. 
There was no change m the ultimate questions in 
the case and defendants should not have b<>en awarded 
attorney fees. 
We request this court to reverse the trial court, and 
remand the proceedings with directions that the trial 
court enter its judgment that Exhibits 7 and 8 are null 
and void. 
Respectfnll~v submitted 
J. Lambert Gibson 
Warwick C. Lamoreaux, 
Attorneys for Appellant 
174 East 8th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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